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THE LESSON OF THE RED SQUIRREL:
CONSENSUS AND BETRAYAL IN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
William H. Rodgers, Jr. *
I. CHARACTERIZING THE GAME AND THE PLAYERS
A. Game Theory
The subjects of legislation and legislative change are undergoing a revival
of sorts in United States' law schools.' The academic community has offered
a variety of theoretical visions on the nature of legislation-purposive and
rational, irrational and political, the accidental outcome of competing inter-
ests, the imperfect product of high philosophy; the legislative process-for-
mal and ritualistic, markets and auctions, plots and cabals, or public-
regarding negotiations; and the individual legislators themselves-ritual
players, auctioneers, maximizers of political gain, profiteers, and philosopher
kings in shiny suits.
This author's personal approach to legal affairs of this sort is to draw on
the laws of biology (loosely construed to include a range of sciences) to gain
insights into the workings of complex social systems.2 This is familiar
ground for students of environmental law since the classical conservation
writers (including George Perkins Marsh and Aldo Leopold) often applied
the lessons of a dynamic physical environment to human cultural choices.'
The centerpiece of this type of analysis is game theory. This analytical ap-
proach is premised on the idea that "the choice of the 'best' is not formal and
• B.A., 1961, Harvard University; LL.B., 1965, Columbia University. Bloedel Profes-
sor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98105. This article derives from a
Brendan F. Brown Lecture delivered at The Catholic University of America, The Columbus
School of Law, Washington, D.C. 20064, November 19, 1987. This article benefitted from a
presentation at a Workshop at the Yale Law School, November, 1986.
1. See, e.g., Special Issue on Legislation: Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 48
U. Prr. L. REV. 619 (1987); Congress' Role and Responsibility in the Federal Balance of
Power, 21 GA. L. REV. 1 (1986); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, at 277
(1985).
2. Rodgers, The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law: The Drifter/Ha-
bitud Distinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195 (1986).
3. W.H. RODGERS, JR., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, preface at v (1986)
(hereinafter 1 AIR & WATER].
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definitive" but "is uniquely dependent upon what the other players do."4
A simple illustration5 will suffice: the red squirrel developed a chattering
strategy to discourage predators like the great homed owl; it was a good
strategy because owls don't waste their time pursuing prey that is alert and
prepared. Unfortunately now, there is a new predator on the block-
humans armed with rifles. Chattering is no longer a good strategy for red
squirrels.
What do legislators have in common with chattering red squirrels? More
perhaps than we would care to admit. It should be emphasized, however,
that legislators (and we are interested specifically in the ones who are enact-
ing the environmental statutes) do their best to get along in two distinctly
different environments. In environment one, the statute is assembled in a
small-numbers bargaining game between key legislators and representatives
of interest groups;6 this game requires trades and exchanges. It is played
over time, and yields a legislative product with "consensus" features (evi-
dences of trading among players who prefer legislation to no legislation).
This legislative gaming, however, has definite termination points (e.g., when
the bill is reported out of committee or enacted). This closing phase marks
the onset of environment two. In the second environment, many of the
bonds of cooperative solidarity developed in environment one are suddenly
loosened. This legislative gaming yields a product with "betrayal" features
(evidence of unilateral gain-seeking by players now free of the constraints of
cooperation). These two environments come equipped with the lesson of the
red squirrel: today's "best" for these players may not look so good in to-
morrow's changed environment.
B. Simplicity of Assumptions
Taking a cue from the physical scientists, the attempt here is to keep the
assumptions to a minimum. As any reader of law reviews can tell you, the
explanatory power of any legal theory (or model) is inversely proportional to
the number of pages needed to describe it.
1. Numbers and Types of Games
In all likelihood, of course, the enactment of complex legislation involves
scores of games with a host of players (e.g., majority v. minority, staffers v.
members, agency v. members, White House v. chair, and so on). These are
assumed to be games in the familiar construct of the prisoners' dilemma-
4. Rodgers, supra note 2, at 197.
5. B. HEINRICH, ONE MAN'S OWL 73-74 (1987).
6. 1 AIR & WATER, supra note 3, at VI-VII.
The Lesson of the Red Squirrel
an uncertain number of repetitions, nonzero sum (A's gains need not equal
B's losses). Each player has some power to hurt the other. Individual games
with many players, known as n-person games in the literature, focus on the
necessity for the building of coalitions.7 The use of coalitions simplifies the
analysis further by permitting a reduction of n-person games to two-person
games. 8 A two-person model may not fit faithfully the details of the legisla-
tive process but it is hoped that it expresses the important dynamics of
bargaining.
2. The Players
The people playing the legislative game need not meet particular tests of
motivation or status.' They can be shadowy lobbyists, powerful environ-
mentalists, or invisible staffers. They can be tools of the special interests,
greedy maximizers driven by deep personal conviction, or prisoners of the
flow of events.)° They can be prophets of God, agents of doom, or servants
of the devil. They can have nicknames like rockhead, boozer, snakeyes, and
traitor.
There are minimal rationality requirements that oblige a player to seek the
highest payoffs during both the iterative and noniterative phases of the legis-
lative game. Payoffs can appear in many guises and must appeal to individ-
ual preferences, but generally they are expected to appear as "favorable"
consideration in the legislative product. As we shall see, strategies are ex-
pected to change as the phase changes. This rationality requirement does
not rule out some nonrational behavior and the type of threats that have
always had a special status in game theoretical analysis."
3. Power Disparities, Fringe Players, and Late Entrants
Life is filled with power disparities that affect bargained-for outcomes.
(The Chicago Bears, to mention but one example, voted 45:1 to bar replace-
7. M.D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 173-74 (rev. ed.
1983) (The forming of coalitions permits a reduction of n-person to two-person games.).
8. See id. at 180-81.
9. See generally Harrison, Strategy and Biology: The Continuing Interest in Self-Interest
(Book Review), 86 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1986).
10. Compare Birnbaum, Personal Reasons: Brush With Adversity is a Potent Motivator for
Many Lawmakers, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (on how the specialties of many
lawmakers are influenced by personal considerations) with Macey, Promoting Public-Regard-
ing Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986).
11. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Deci-
sionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 212 n. 146 (1980) (discussing the bargaining advan-
tages of the fanatic).
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ment players from the team, but this strong show of solidarity did not sur-
vive the single positive vote of Coach Mike Ditka). Obviously, some
bargainers are more equal than others in the lawmaking game. The theory
requires only that the players fall short of an all-powerful position that can
do best by unilateral action. So long as the cooperation of others is needed,
payoffs can be expected to bridge the differences between the parties. Some-
times a scrap is sufficient. The environmental statutes are filled with case-
specific benefits for the constituents of individual members of Congress.' 2
These may be the result of political compensation necessary to dissuade neg-
ative votes, or they may be courtesy payoffs to maintain the enthusiasm of
fringe players.
Another version of the fringe player is presented by the problem of late
entrants. It is intuitively plausible that the process of enacting legislation
has crests or phase changes when the prospects of passing a piece of legisla-
tion jump from the remote to the probable (e.g., the Chair has said, "There
will be a bill," or Presidential backing becomes more than lip service). At
this point, for a variety of reasons, the process is likely to capture and hold
players whose commitment to a "consensus" means only that they would
rather be included than excluded from negotiations that are going to happen
anyway. In other words, you can take the only train to New Haven, or you
can walk. 13
This phenomenon of being reluctant to defect from a game that can pro-
ceed without you is underscored by the Environmental Protection Agency's
experience with negotiated rulemakings. The agency has resorted to the pro-
cedure four times: 1) to develop the rules for hazardous waste injection;
2) nonperformance penalties for truck engines; 3) pesticide rules for emer-
gency exemptions; and 4) farmworker protection.14 The most salient conse-
quence is that a "consensus" can be produced by these negotiations in what
appear to be the most implausible of circumstances. It is difficult to imagine
why the environmentalists abided by, much less consented to, definitions of
12. See, e.g., W.H. RODGERS, JR., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, § 4.2, at
27-29, § 4.23, at 344 (1986) [hereinafter 2 AIR & WATER].
13. This means that participants in the game include not only those who prefer legislation
to no legislation but also those who, if faced with the prospect, prefer "influenced" legislation
over "uninfluenced" legislation. Here are groups with clear incentives to work towards legisla-
tion that is "better" for them while being perfectly content with the prospect that the entire
structure may come tumbling down. Legislation is undiscriminating in its allocation of re-
wards so the game remains open to fringe participants, latecomers, or poor sports.
14. W.H. RODGERS, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, § 5.16 at 215 ("the
agency has hope for the procedures in limited contexts - those with a small number of inter-
ests affected, readily identifiable pressure groups, confined agendas, and raising issues of defini-
tion and mid-level policy consequences") [hereinafter 3 AIR & WATER]. Agency staffers,
including senior personnel, keep a tight grip on the negotiations process.
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an "emergency" that would allow the use of unregistered pesticides to avoid
an abnormal fluctuation in profits by an agricultural enterprise."5 Of course,
the choice is understandable if quitting the game means that you get nothing
rather than a chance at something.16 In this context and with this interpre-
tation the hard question is to explain why anybody would decline to partici-
pate in the game. The farmworker representatives did walk out of the
rulemaking on pesticide field reentry standards, 17 and this author wonders
why.
The problem of those who come reluctantly to the negotiation table does
damage to the concept of a "consensus" statute. Although enactment of a
particular piece of legislation may not occur without the dominant players
preferring legislation to no legislation, there is still some room in this situa-
tion for free riders or parasites. Not every feature of the statute needs to be
explained as a consensus-builder; but it cannot be a consensus breaker. This
strain on the "consensus" concept is made more acute by the noniterative
aspects of the game discussed below.
II. THE PRODUCT OF ITERATIVE GAMES
A. Consensus Laws
A variety of academic works in recent times have explored unusual cir-
cumstances in which cooperation can be established among principals with
strikingly different objectives.'" The crucial distinction that gives rise to co-
operation is frequent interaction. Repeated opportunities for reward and
punishment are important ingredients of reciprocity."9 The development of
legislation, described as an iterative game played over time, is precisely the
sort of occasion expected to give rise to a cooperative outcome containing
"wins" for all the players. This expectation of a "consensus" law is compati-
ble with other theoretical reasons for believing that the environmental stat-
15. These rules are proposed in 50 Fed. Reg. 13,944 (1985) (April 8, 1985) and adopted
without substantial change in 51 Fed. Reg. 1896 (1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 166 (1987)).
16. The pesticide emergency exemption rule has a smattering of "somethings" for envi-
ronmentalists, including the possibility of resorting to unregistered pesticides to protect endan-
gered species. Ordinarily, players on a team lacking three-point shooters would resist
endorsing a three-point rule if the other players were expected to gain a greater advantage.
17. A prediction that your participation would earn you nothing might support a walkout
to save one's dignity ("How dumb do they think we are?") not to mention the costs of contin-
ued participation. A walkout might be justified, even with predictions of a worsened position,
because a complete rout could lead to judicial intervention that might be withheld in the mere
case of severe injustice. Lawyers trapped in hopeless forums have been known to provoke
error in the hopes of a subsequent collateral success.
18. R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984), which has been cited in
scores of academic studies from a variety of different disciplines.
19. See Rodgers, supra note 2.
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utes are the product of a "consensus" among key legislators and interest
groups who prefer legislation to no legislation. 20 This prediction receives
mild confirmation from the surprising number of enactments in the field that
bear the "consensus" label,2 and much stronger verification from the wide-
spread appearance in the environmental statutes of nonzero-sum features,
where disadvantages to some players are offset by compensating gains within
the same legislative package.22
Accepting this "consensus" characterization for the moment, attention is
drawn to the contents of a law product that can win the universal assent of
the bargainers. Achieving this formidable goal calls for coalition-building in
the extreme- some kind of miracle package that can create winners without
losers. How can this be accomplished? Several prospects come to mind, and
all are represented in the environmental statutes.
B. Strategies of Consensus
1. Dissembling and Manipulation
Students of political decisionmaking are quick to remind us that in con-
tests between several alternatives and more than two voters "the outcome
depends as much on the procedure of amalgamation as on the tastes of par-
ticipants.",2 3 The skillful political decisionmaker is able to juggle parame-
ters, by controlling agenda, adding dimensions, and the like, to influence the
outcome in a voting setting. One of the classical cases of this art form is
former Senator Warren Magnuson's success in defeating proposals to ship
nerve gas to his home state of Washington by recharacterizing the issue as
one of Senate prerogative rather than local objection.24
These stark necessities of the political mind prompt us to entertain the
prospect of legislative provisions that would allow both dissembling and ma-
nipulation by the principals. In this context, dissembling means hoping to
achieve A by voting for B and manipulation means a packing of the agenda
to make dissembling possible. Put simply, one might expect these "consen-
sus" laws to have safe refuges for hiding "no" votes under a "yes" veneer.
20. Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federali-
zation of Environmental Law, I J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
21. See 1 AIR & WATER, supra note 3, at vi-vii n.5.
22. See id. at vii. Traditional logrolling arises where favors in the context of legislative
measure A are paid back in the context of legislative measure B. A breakdown in legislative
discipline (a condition said to accompany Congressional "reforms") may reinforce a tendency
to include favor and payback within the same measure.
23. See W.H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 152 (1986) (discussing,
among other works, that of A.K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970)).
24. Id. at 207 (drawing upon the popular book of E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLA-
TION (1973)).
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Doctrinal prospects for this service include provisions on federalism, proce-
dural entitlement, and the allocation of authority among different agencies.25
2. Issue Expansion
Another tip on legislative content can be drawn from the theory and prac-
tice of negotiations. Bargaining is said to thrive in settings where there are
mismatches in the intensity of preferences, and mismatches can be created
by expanding the agenda of issues.26 This means that the elusive "consen-
sus" can be obtained not only by faction-spanning devices that command the
support of several principals but also by faction-spanners accommodating
varying degrees of intensities of preference. For present purposes, it might
be possible to filter legislation through this lens and identify the legislative
provisions that are indispensable to certain players and those that are a mat-
ter of indifference to them. Valuable statutory acquisitions that are viewed
with indifference by some of the players are a useful currency in any exercise
of consensus-building."
C. Evidence of Consensus
Alerted by the theory to anticipate "consensus", it is visible everywhere in
the fabric and structure of the federal environmental statutes.
First, are the process entitlements, hedges, and bets. These are the ultimate
nonzero-sum lubricants of the environmental laws. Congress creates process
in wholesale bursts, and it is used freely to assuage those made victim in
other particulars. A promise to A of substantive relief from pollution can be
offset by a promise to B of respectful procedural preconditions. Process also
is a currency that is useful for smoothing off nonsymetrical preferences and
spanning issues that are finely decomposed. Moreover, process is a payoff
medium of particular attraction to lawyer/lobbyists. Procedural opportu-
nity often is a bet on one's future competence (or a challenge to it), and it is
easy to feel smug about the high value of a future hearing featuring oneself.
(Environmentalists are notorious suckers for promises of access to future
decisionmaking that will be helpful to them but more than helpful to the
25. One would expect this tendency to be confirmed by a study of all dissenting legislative
views during enactment of the federal environmental laws in the last twenty years. That is,
opposition is likely to be directed at the means, not the ends, and to recite structural and
process objections to the goals included in the legislation that was enacted.
26. See Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 85
DUKE L.J. 261, 331-33 (1985) (and authorities cited therein).
27. The "consensus" proposals in the 1986 negotiated agreement to amend the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act included provisions to strengthen patent protec-
tion for registered pesticides. These provisions are valuable treasures for the registrants and
are only mildly objectionable to environmentalists.
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other folks who can swamp the process).2"
Second, are the options of vagueness, ambiguity, and delegation. These
techniques are recognized in the literature as serviceable tools of choice-
avoidance.29 They expand the textual landscape and thus allow refuge for a
wide variety of legislative points of view.
Third, are a variety of other opportunities for dissembling and manipula-
tion, as mentioned above. Most of the votes in Congress opposing the envi-
ronmental statutes are planted firmly in these refuges (of which federalism is
perhaps the most important).
Fourth, are the postponements. These suit the nonzero-sum strictures of
the process quite well, and of course take a wide variety of forms (e.g., dele-
gations and deferrals). Study provisions are rampant in the environmental
laws and they are sustained by a host of tactical aims such as decision-avoid-
ance, information acquisition, experimentation, and even elaborate plots for
future action.3°
Fifth, are the conundrums of self-nullification where command and coun-
termand are stuffed into the same sorry package. This is the game without
losers written small, and it has produced some extravagant legislative con-
traptions featuring confounding procedures, implausible grandfathering, and
loops and mazes filled with variances and exclusions.3 Entire chapters of
environmental texts are devoted to exemptions, variances, and escape-
routes.3 2
Sixth, are the teases (aspirational commands), which include an assort-
ment of expressions that are without hope or any viable means of implemen-
tation. 33 This is another instance of the nullification appearing in close
28. See, e.g., Rodgers, Siting Power Plants in Washington State, 47 WASH. L. REV. 9
(1971).
29. See Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Ambiguity
as a Control Device, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 565 (1973). See also Hoy, Interpreting the Law:
Hermeneutical and Post Structuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 143 (1985) ("the
range of possibilities for textual meaning is greater than for speaker's meaning."); Tribe, To-
ward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Si-
lence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
30. See I AIR & WATER, supra note 3, at 174-76; 2 AIR & WATER, supra note 12, at 7-9.
Former Senator Commerce Committee Chief Counsel Michael Pertschuk is credited with the
device of the Consumer Product Safety Commission as a necessary precursor of consumer
product safety legislation. The Indian Policy Review Commission was created with a similar
scenario in the minds of its sponsors but no legislation resulted.
31. For one among many illustrations, see I AIR & WATER, supra note 3, § 3.23, at 377
(visibility protection).
32. See, e.g., 1 AIR & WATER, supra note 3, § 3.13, at 289, § 3.14, at 297, § 3.17, at 321,
§ 3.35-.37, at 507-36.
33. Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of
Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978).
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proximity to the entitlement, that gives rights (or rather hopes) that are am-
putated and constrained. These half-laws are found commonly in statutory
statements of purpose. Teases can be viewed as evidence either of the con-
sensus traits of environmental statutes (the parties can agree because not
much has been said), or their betrayal traits (because someone has big plans
for an ostensibly harmless statement of purpose).
III. PRODUCT OF NONITERATIVE GAMES
A. Betrayal Laws
The vision of harmony outlined above is not the only vision competing for
recognition. Major amendments to the environmental statutes occur period-
ically (perhaps every eight to ten years), and with a substantial turnover in
the negotiating players (lobbyists, staffers, and members of Congress). At
the point of enactment, the iterative game, dominated by strategies of coop-
eration, suddenly becomes noniterative and characterized by isolated inter-
action. Here, the temptation to defect is great, and the exploitative gain is
within reach.3 4
B. Evidence of Betrayal
In response to the noniterative features of the legislative game, the search
is directed to the antithesis of consensus, and we find:
First, the defections which are characterized by last-minute changes in
substance or purpose of the legislation that substantially reallocate the legis-
lative benefits and burdens. Players who promote these changes exploit end-
of-the-game advantages when the normal rules of cooperative bargaining are
suspended. The techniques include: last-minute amendments; secret tack-
ons to appropriations bills; contrived floor debate; language in the Confer-
ence Report contradicting the bill; and sundry other sneaky and eleventh-
hour revisions. These things happen, of course,3' and the people who ac-
complish them are called masters of the legislative art.
Second, are the sleepers. These are provisions in a bill of enormous practi-
cal consequence that slip through as a result of neglect or other circum-
stances inherent in the lawmaking process. Although sleepers are a product
34. See generally Rodgers, supra note 2; Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest
Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 655.
35. An interesting near-miss in the fall of 1986 was the attempt by lameduck Senator Paul
Laxalt to amend an appropriations bill to accomplish Senate ratification of the California-
Nevada Interstate Compact. The result would have been to allow massive diversions of water
from the Truckee River to the detriment of Pyramid Lake, including the Pyramid Lake Indian
Tribe.
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of disparate bargaining abilities and limited vision of the players, they are
aided by the end-of-the-game phenomenon (the stresses of time that can de-
feat close analysis). A few examples: Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act of 197336 (that worked an absolutist protection of the habitat for all
listed species) was the handiwork of a single staffer on the House Interior
Committee.3 7 The National Environmental Policy Act of 196938 itself was a
vast sleeper, with consequences that outran the wildest imagination of its
sponsors and most enthusiastic supporters. (The bestowal of a social good
greatly in excess of design puts credit-claimers in a quandary).
Third, are the skewers which are defined as a shifting of liabilities to non-
participants in the legislative game. Skewers are examples of political cost-
externalization. This relief from the stress of an in-house allocation would
be fully anticipated by students of energy systems, 39 and is aided by the well
known difficulties in the forming of organizations.' A common skewer of
the environmental laws is a shifting of the liabilities to the taxpayer (e.g.,
indemnification for the owners of banned pesticides, and for beekeepers
whose charges are felled by errant pesticides; a small price to pay if you're a
citizens group holding out, say, for a citizens suit clause). Nominating ab-
sentees to assume the costs of enactment is evidence of cooperation not de-
fection among the players, although it looks like defection to the victims.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE HYBRID STATUTES
This survey of the environmental statutes has uncovered evidences of the
hybrid nature of the environmental legislation that combines both "consen-
sus" and "betrayal" features. The most conspicuous feature of this account
is that it contradicts most if not all of the prevailing assumptions customarily
extended to statutes. This author takes as a counterpoint an authoritative
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
37. See generally Erdheim, The Wake of the Snail Darter Insuring the Effectiveness of
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 629 (1981); Houck, The "Institution-
alization of Caution" Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act: What Do you Do When
You Don't Know, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 15001 (1982); Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter.
An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 805 (1986).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
39. See L.A. WHITE, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZA-
TION TO THE FALL OF ROME (1959). See also Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 20, at
329-30 (discussing political cost-externalization).
40. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS (1965). See also Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (1983) (virtually all legislation is designed to produce
"private goods at public expense"), criticized in Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, I J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
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description offered by Reed Dickerson:4
* "[I]n a statute it is generally assumed that the draftsman used
his words in their normal senses and that he meant what he
said."'4 2  But what of the dissembling, teases, and self-
nullifications?
* "It is further assumed that the draftsman did not intend to con-
tradict himself."43 But what of the case where self-contradiction is
essential to achieve a precarious consensus?
* "Third, it is assumed that the statute is intended to produce a
constitutional result."'  But is it significant that constitutionality
of result rarely figures in the calculations of the individual
lawmakers?
* "Fourth, it is assumed that 'the legislature was made up of rea-
sonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably'., 45 But
what of the opportunistic and irrational forays of which there is
no, or little evidence?
* "Finally, it is assumed that the draftsman did not include lan-
guage unless it contributed to the ideas expressed.",46 But what of
the teases, dissembling, vagueness, and contradictions that are an
important ingredient of the legislative process?
Some of the apparent differences between these accounts of statutory law
may disappear upon further analysis. Also, there may be convincing norma-
tive reasons why courts and other interpreters might adhere to a view of
legislation that departs from that which is practiced. For the moment, how-
ever, this author is content to offer an account of the lawmaking product
that departs from historical visions of comprehensive rationality.
V. CONCLUSION
Environmental lawyers often are drawn into observations of natural popu-
lations, systems and actors. This article has succumbed to the temptation to
extend these habits of scrutiny to another field of complex and elegant crea-
tion-the federal environmental statutes. The red squirrel gives us a hint of
what to look for in the environmental laws. One suspects that there is not a
great deal of stability in a law product that represents an uneasy coalition of
"consensus" and "betrayal". But we will leave to another day to assess the
41. Dickerson, Obscene Telephone Calls: An Introduction to the Reading of Statutes, 22
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longer-term prospects of statutes that are stitched together in this anxious
tactical game.
